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the statute does not provide for property held under a claim of
right; it applies to that held under an unrestricted right." Clearly
the rights which an embezzler has in the misappropriated funds are
restricted by the claim of the true owner. It may well be that Con-
gress did not intend for embezzlers to have this deduction, particu-
larly in view of the fact that the Wilcox case was in full effect at
the time the statute was adopted. Because the Court did not actually
consider the problem, the right of an embezzler to take a deduction
under Section 1341 of the Internal Revenue Code upon the return
of the misappropriated funds is still open to question.
The complexities involved in the instant case are clearly mani-
fested by the many opinions written. The questions of willfulness in
income tax evasion, stare decisis in the Supreme Court, ex post
facto effect of Supreme Court decisions, double prosecutions from
one illegal transaction, and federal intrusion into local law enforce-
ment are all raised by the Court and are beyond the scope of this
Note. However, in its field of tax law, the case stands as the culmina-
tion of a gradual but certain development. It brings uniformity
where there was previously the confusion and ambiguity of the
Wilcox decision. It establishes a test for taxability which will prob-
ably remain valid for many years in a realm where absolutes are rare.
Charles Ted Raines, Jr.
The Role of Price Discrimination in Determining
the Passage of Illegal Brokerage
Respondent was a brokerage firm representing some twenty-five
seller principals of whom one was Canada Foods, Ltd., a Canadian
corporation which processed apple concentrate. A buyer, the J. M.
Smucker Co., through Phipps, another brokerage firm, had ap-
proached Canada Foods with an offer to buy an unusually large
quantity of apple concentrate at less than the established price.
This offer was refused, Canada Foods taking the position that unless
the brokerage fee could be reduced, no sale could be made at the
price demanded by the buyer. Smucker then entered into negotia-
tions with Respondent acting as the broker. Respondent's usual
commission rate was five per cent; but for the sale involved here,
respondent agreed to lower its rate to three per cent so that Canada
Foods would accept this large order at less than the regular price.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1341 (a) (1).
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All subsequent sales were made to the Smucker Co. at the lower price,
with Broch receiving the lower commission, while sales to buyers
other than the Smucker Co. carried the usual five per cent broker-
age commission. The savings to the seller as a result of the lower
brokerage fee constituted fifty per cent of the total price reduction,
so that both the broker and the seller shared the resultant "loss" of
profit. Based on its findings, the Federal Trade Commission issued a
cease-and-desist order prohibiting respondent from granting, directly
or indirectly, any allowance in lieu of brokerage where such allow-
ance was reflected by a reduction in the seller's price. Held: (1) The
"any person" phrase of section 2 (c) of the Clayton Act as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act encompasses a seller's broker; and
(2) the acceptance of a reduction in brokerage fee by a seller's
broker, such reduction being reflected in a lower selling price, is an
"allowance in lieu of brokerage" in violation of that section.1 Federal
Trade Coinm'n v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
Section 2 of the original Clayton Act,' part of the anti-trust
scheme intended to promote and maintain a relatively free com-
petitive economy,' was designed to prevent price discrimination.'
However, the original section 2 was limited primarily in its applica-
'Section 2 (c) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), makes it unlawful for:
[A]ny person . . . to pay or grant . . . anything of value as a commission,
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof,
except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods
. . . either to the other party to such transaction or to an intermediary
therein ...
'The original § 2 of the 1914 Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1915), read:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities, which commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale . . . where the effect of such discrimination may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent dis-
crimination in price between purchasers of commodities on account of dif-
ferences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that
makes only due allowance for differences in the cost of selling or transporta-
tion, or discrimination in price in the same or different commodities made in
good faith to meet competition ...
' See generally Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems under the Robinson-
Patman Act (1959); Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law (1959); Neale, The Antitrust
Laws of the U.S.A. (1960).
4 Austin, op. cit. supra note 3, at 6:
In drafting § 2 of the 1914 Clayton Act, Congress was chiefly concerned with
local or territorial price cutting. Large producers and manufacturers having the
benefit of wide distribution were able to lower their prices in communities
where they had competition, while maintaining higher prices elsewhere. Such
local price cutting was intended not for the legitimate purpose of meeting com-
petition, but for the purpose of putting a local competitor out of business. ...
The competition principally affected by this type of discrimination is, of
course, competition with the discriminating seller, not competition between
the seller's customers.
tion to a "line of commerce," i.e., competition between sellers at
the manufacturing or producing levels as contrasted to competition
between those sellers' customers. With the advent of concentrated
buying power in the growing chain store organizations of the 1930's,
protection was needed for the small local businesses competing with
the chains.' One of the major purposes of the Robinson-Patman
amendment of 1936 was to fortify the old section 2 with a more
elaborate set of provisions designed to prevent powerful buyers from
obtaining "undue favors" from sellers.7 Among these provisions was
section 2 (c), known as the "brokerage section,"' which has as its
specific purpose the prevention of discrimination through the manipu-
lation of brokerage fees.' The primary stimulus to its passage was
a mass of evidence" showing the success of large buying chains in
obtaining discriminatory prices by setting up "dummy" brokers,
and, in effect, collecting their fees." Since it was feared that the end
result of this and similar practices would be the weakening of com-
petition, 2 and since the possible methods of manipulating brokerage
fees are so varied, section 2 (c) makes it illegal for any party to a
transaction to pay or grant anything of value as a commission, or
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in
lieu thereof, to the other party to the transaction." It was apparently
felt that the desired end would be guaranteed only by arbitrarily
prohibiting all such methods,' without reference to competitive
effect.
'Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923).
'For a general discussion of this background see Austin, op. cit. supra note 3, at 6-11.
Neale, op. cit. supra note 3, at 216-53.
' See note 1 supra.
'FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d
763 (4th Cir. 1939); 80 Cong. Rec. 6281-82 (1936); 80 Cong. Rec. 3114 (1936); New
York State B.A. Section on Antitrust Laws, Discrimination in Practices, in How to Comply
With the Antitrust Laws 174, 180 (CCH 1954).
"Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935).
11 H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14- 15 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1936).
An example of such a scheme would be a situation in which a large buyer formed a
subsidiary company which had as its sole function the negotiation of the buyer's purchases.
For such negotiation, the subsidiary would receive the normal brokerage fees. The effect
of these dealings would be that the purchasing department of the buyer, acting as a
"separate" organization, would collect fees for the buyer, thus allowing the net expenditures
of the large buyer in a given transaction to be less than those of a small buyer not in an
economic position to form a "subsidiary."
1a H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936).
"Ibid.; see Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940).
4 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
774 (1945): "It is perfectly clear that all three of these practices [those prohibited by
sections 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e)] were forbidden because of their tendency to lessen competi-
tion and create monopoly, without regard to their effect in a particular ease."
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There are no defenses provided within section 2(c)." To estab-
lish a violation, all that must be shown is that brokerage or value
in lieu threof has passed to an adversary party. Payments reflecting
brokerage from seller to buyer" or buyer to seller," from seller to
buyer's broker or controlled intermediary, 8 from buyer's broker
to buyer," all have been declared expressly illegal by the courts."
Although the instant decision is the first judicial holding that a
seller's broker is included within the scope of 2 (c)," dictum from
an earlier decision has indicated that such was the case." Administra-
tive decisions have expressly held that payments by seller's brokers
to buyers are illegal." Further, in order to show that illegal brokerage
has been passed, it is not necessary to show (1) that competition has
been adversely affected; 4 (2) that price discrimination has in fact
"There is a proviso within the statute which was initially believed to be a defense.
This is the phrase "except for services rendered" which now, after judicial interpretation, has
come to include only payments to brokers by their employers. It is, therefore, not a
defense, merely a safeguard against a construction which would make broker compensation
illegal. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 625 (1940); see Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940).
1' Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
774 (1945); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, supra note 16; Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co.,
90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Body Steffner Co. v. Flotill Prod., 63 Cal. App. 2d 555,
147 P.2d 84 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
"The intent of Congress, the reports of the committees, and the Act are all specific on
this point. The payment of any brokerage by the seller to the buyer is prohibited." Patman,
The Robinson-Patman Act 108 (1938). See also H.R. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15
(1936); Edwards, Twenty Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 29 J. Bus. U. of Chi. 149
(1956).
' Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
's FTC v. Herzog, 150 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1945); Modern Marketing Service v. FTC,
149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945); Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d
12 (6th Cir. 1943); Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
625 (1940); National Used Car Market Report v. National Auto Dealers Ass'n, 108 F.
Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1951).
'" Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, supra note 19, Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d
763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
305 U.S. 634 (1938).
as It will be noticed that these are all of the possible combinations of the three parties
mentioned, viz., buyer, buyer's broker, and seller.
21In Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 145 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa.
1956), it was alleged that a seller's broker (a fruit auctioning corporation), being paid for
its services by the seller (fruit growers), was also exacting fees from the buyer (an association
of fruit merchants). The court held that if the allegation were true, then § 2(c) had
been violated. While the wrong in this case is not the same as the wrong in the instant
case, i.e., the concentration of economic power in the seller's broker forcing injustice rather
than concentration in the buyer resulting in price discrimination, the case does include a
seller's broker within the terms of § 2(c).
"See, e.g., Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 1939); cf. H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
" Custom House Packing Corp., 43 F.T.C. 164 (1946); W. E. Robinson & Co., 32 F.T.C.
370 (1941).
'
4 Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638
(1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
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resulted; (3) that there is no cost or economic justification for such
passage;2" (4) that a public need is being served by prosecution." It
is the act of manipulating brokerage fees to effect such a passage
which is illegal, and this act seems illegal per se,"s regardless of which
party does the manipulating.
In accord with this policy of prevention of brokerage fee manipu-
lation, the court stated two principles: 2 first, a seller's broker is
within the scope of section 2 (c); and, second, a reduction in his
brokerage fee by a broker, coupled with a price reduction to the
buyer by the seller, may, under certain circumstances, violate that
section."0 As to the first principle, both the majority and minority
opinions agreed," their opinions being in accord with past decisions."2
It is over the second principle that conflict arose. The majority
reasoned that "there is no difference in economic effect between
the seller's broker splitting his brokerage commission with the
buyer, and in his yielding part of the brokerage to the seller to
be passed on to the buyer in the form of a lower price." 3 It qualified
this statement by saying, "This is not to say that every reduction
in price coupled with a reduction in brokerage automatically com-
25""The fact that the granting of a purported brokerage fee to a buyer may in a
particular case result in discriminatory prices is immaterial." FTC v. Washington Fish &
Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1959).
"Subsections (c), (d), and (e) make unlawful certain business practices other than
price discrimination." FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959).
See also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 625 (1940).26 Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634
(1938); see Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, supra note 25; Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102
F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
2FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109
F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940); Kentucky-Tennessee Light &
Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd, 136 F.2d 12
(6th Cir. 1943).
21 Senator Logan stated, "The bill prohibits the act, and that prohibition would extend
alike to all who are affected by it." 80 Cong. Rec. 3115 (1936).
Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, supra note 27; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Biddle Purchasing Co. v.
FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938); Kentucky-Tennessee Light
& Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., supra note 27; Robinson v. Stanley Home Prod., Inc.,
178 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass 1959); W. E. Robinson & Co., Inc., 32 F.T.C. 370 (1941).
29 The normal procedure in cases such as the instant case is for the FTC to bring suit
against the seller rather than the broker. In the instant case proof of brokerage manipulation
would have been more realistic, precedent would have been more pertinent, and Congres-
sional sanction would have been more clearly applicable. However, it must be noted that
the seller here was located in Canada, and outside the practical jurisdiction of the Commission.
3In Main Fish Co., 53 F.T.C. 88 (1956), the FTC said that even though the circum-
stances of that case did not indicate that illegal brokerage had passed, under the proper
circumstances a brokerage reduction coupled with a price reduction could be held illegal.
31 Both opinions agreed that clearly "any person" includes seller's brokers. See the ma-
jority opinion at 170, 175; the dissenting opinion at 179.
a See notes 22, 23, 28 supra.
33 363 U.S. at 174-75.
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pels the conclusion that an allowance 'in lieu' of brokerage has been
granted." 4 The fact that the majority was convinced that the result-
ant price to one buyer was discriminatory,"s seemed to be the catalyst
to their final reasoning, because this indicated to it that indirect
brokerage was illegally passed to the buyer. The minority, using
a completely different line of reasoning, felt that 2 (c) did not
apply to the facts of this case because there was nothing to indicate
that brokerage or anything in lieu thereof was passed to the buyer."
The only thing the broker did under these facts was to lower his
brokerage rate; the seller offered the reduced price. The lowering
of brokerage rate is not illegal, and the minority saw no legal con-
nection between such lowering and the price reduction. The minority
reasoned that if there is any action under the instant facts, it would
be against the seller under the price discrimination section, section
2 (a)," where the seller would have available to him the defenses
defined therein, specifically, the "cost justification" defense."
34 3 6 3 U.S. at 175.
as "[T]he reduction in brokerage was made to obtain this particular order and this order
only and therefore was clearly discriminatory." 363 U.S. at 176.
3 6 3 U.S. at 182:
[T]bis is not a case where the buyer has claimed or received either directly
or through its intermediary, any brokerage . . . as compensation for services.
Nor has the buyer obtained any allowance or discount because of any "savings"
claimed to have been effected for the seller through elimination by the buyer
or his broker of services normally performed by the seller or his broker.
The minority opinion looked at the earlier cases in which the buyer claimed compensa-
tion for his services (e.g., the A &% P case), or for "savings" which he, the buyer, effected
for the seller. Those two situations were the principal evils at which 2(c) was originally
directed, and they were the subject of most of the early cases. The minority took the view
that those were the only instances in which 2(c) applied, and in support of that view
cited the Biddle case, the Oliver Bros. case, the A & P case, and the Southgate case as
examples of these two evils. Then the dissenters went on to say in a footnote, "Such cases
must be distinguished from those in which the nature of the seller's own operation, without
more, enables it to effect legitimate savings in brokerage and other distribution costs." 363
U.S. at 182 n.6. The contention was that 2(c) was not meant to interfere with the rela-
tions between a broker and his employer, and anything involving these relations has nothing
to do with illegal brokerage payments to a buyer. Such reasoning, it seems, is unrealistic,
and not in accord with either the legislative history of 2(c) or with the reasoning of the
cases. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
7 Section 2(a), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . either directly or indirectly, to dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly . . . or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
Provided, That nothing contained in sections 12, 13, 14-21, and 22-27 of this
title shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold
or delivered. ...
85 The pertinent defense here is the one known as the "cost justification" defense which
provides that if the party allegedly granting a discriminatory price can justify that price
on the basis of savings, i.e., "differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery re-
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The real question, then, is the validity of the majority's use of
discrimination to link the brokerage reduction with the price reduc-
tion and thus to show the passage of an illegal allowance in lieu of
brokerage. The intent of Congress seems to have been to prevent
direct concessions to buyers or their agents by the seller or his agents
so that the buyers would gain economic advantage over their com-
petitors. 9 Since the limits of section 2 (c) were not clearly delineated
in the statute, there has been a constant administrative pressure to
extend them, and such extension has been gradually accepted by'the
courts, until now, under this decision, it encompasses virtually any
benefit to the buyer, by any means, directly or indirectly involving
brokerage." Such a broad effect probably was not envisioned by the
draftsmen of 2 (c), but there is no concrete evidence that they
would have been adverse to it since it is consistent with the spirit
of the amendment.41 Realizing that the subject for scrutiny is a
specific price reduction, the answer to the question raised about
the role of discrimination in a 2 (c) action and, in conjunction, the
role of "cost justification"4 where discrimination is actually a factor
would seem to be as follows: Under 2(a), the question would be
asked-can the reduction be justified economically? If so, then
2 (a) has not been violated; cost justification is an absolute defense.
Under 2 (c), the question would be asked-does the reduction re-
flect an allowance in lieu of brokerage? If so, then 2 (c) has been
violated regardless of "cost justification." In order to answer the
2 (c) question, it becomes necessary to determine whether brokerage
is reflected in the price reduction.4 Here is where discrimination
may be decisive, i.e., where the fact of a discriminatory price may
be the prime indicator of the illegal passage of an allowance in lieu
of brokerage. The cases have held that it is not necessary to show
actual discrimination in order to prove a violation of 2 (c)." How-
suiting from the differing methods or quantities in which commodities are . . . sold or
delivered," then that price is not discriminatory, and, therefore, not in violation of § 2(a).
See note 37 supra.
" The legislative history of § 2 (c) is, at best, vague. For a concise statement of the
value of its legislative history see Austern, Robinson-Patman Act Symposium 37 (CCH 1946).
4 For past trends see notes 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 27 supra.
41 See notes 7, 9, 13, 14 supra.
42 See note 38 supra.
43 Frederick Rowe, in his new book, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman
Act 340 (1962), phrases it this way, "[A] price reduction to the buyer, when equivalent
in purpose and effect to the illicit payment of a broker's fee to the buyer, may constitute
an allowance or discount 'in lieu of' brokerage within the scope of 2 (c)."
Interestingly, Mr. Rowe, who represented Broch in the instant case, devotes a major
part of his Chapter 12 to a discussion of the impact and ramifications of the Broch case
in the 2 (c) area.
44 See note 25 supra. It will be noticed that in all cases where it is held that it is not
necessary to show discrimination, the alleged violation is based on actual brokerage pay-
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ever, the cases have not held, nor has it been suggested, that the
presence of discrimination may not be a factor to be considered."5
If it becomes useful to the FTC to show discrimination, then it
would seem that the reasoning behind "cost justification" must have
a logical place in determining whether a seller's price reduction
reflects an allowance in lieu of brokerage, because in order to show
discrimination it must at least be alleged that the price in question
is below established prices, and that such a price is not explainable
by ordinary business conditions." The distinction to be made is
that "cost justification" as a defense under 2 (a) is absolute, while
"cost justification" as a concept or approach under 2 (c) is merely
evidentiary, i.e., the weighing of the fact of a reduced price against
the reasons for that reduction is done to help determine whether a
particular price reduction reflects an allowance in lieu of brokerage."
The importance of this distinction is that the court is left free to
interpret the economic environment in order to determine whether,
in fact, an illegal allowance has passed to the buyer.
ments, and that the reason for the introduction of the issue of discrimination is defensive
on the part of the party alleged to have made such payment. The contention is that since
there was no discrimination, there was no violation. The courts are consistent in the holding
that discrimination is not essential in order to show that 2(c) has been violated.
41 Citing Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945), and Baysoy v.
Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950), Cyrus Austin, op. cit. supra note 3, at
108, makes the statement:
While discrimination is not an element of the offense, it is ordinarily necessary
in direct dealing cases to show that the seller sold to other customers through
brokers, and the prices charged, in order to prove that the rebate or discount
to the buyer was in fact in the nature of brokerage or in lieu thereof. On the
other hand, if a commission is paid to an agent or controlled intermediary of
a single buyer, no other proof is necessary.
0 Here "ordinary business conditions" is used in the sense of those conditions or circum-
stances which would be introduced in conjunction with a "cost justification" defense under
2 (a), e.g., variance in transportation costs.
" It may be useful here to consider the recent FTC decision of Thomasville Chair Co.,
Trade Reg. Rep. 5 29510 (1961). There a furniture manufacturer was held to have violated
2 (c) by passing on to certain jobber purchasers a 59 price reduction realized in part from
payment of only a 3% commission to respondent's salesmen on sales to such favored
customers. Respondent's usual sales commission was 6%. In effect what the Commission
did in its complaint, and by the presentation of its evidence, was raise a presumption that
there was an illegal passage of an allowance in lieu of brokerage, thus shifting the burden
of proving there was not such a passage to respondent. When respondent was unable to
justify completely the price reduction, illegal passage was assumed, and a violation found.
Thomasville Chair is another example of an instance where discriminatory prices indi-
cated an illegal passing of an allowance, there by the seller, in lieu of brokerage, through
the salesmen's commissions. Thomasville Chair did not hold, as is suggested in Handler,
Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Yale L.J. 75, 104 (1961), that a seller could not pay
its salesmen different commissions based on recognized business economies, e.g., lower rates
on sales to high volume accounts, and then sell the high volume goods at lower prices. The
difficulty in that case was that the seller was grossly inconsistent in its practices, such in-
consistency resulting in favoritism and price discrimination.
The indication in Thomasville Chair, as in the instant case, is that where a price reduc-
tion reflects (or contains) an allowance derived from an unrealistic or fictitious "savings"
in brokerage, then 2(c) is violated. But where there is a true savings based on real economies,
and there is a general price reduction available to all, then 2 (c) is not violated.
The greatest danger arising from the instant decision is not a
weakness in the decision itself but the possibility of its improper
future interpretation. Section 2 (c) has been a speedy and effective
weapon against a particular Congressionally-focused evil, viz., the
abuse of the great economic power concentrated in large buyers.
The speed and effectiveness of 2 (c) are primarily due to its "per se"
thrust, i.e., the absolute prohibition of any brokerage manipulation,
regardless of any mitigating factors. If this "per se thrust" is to
be preserved, then the broad freedom to scrutinize economic environ-
ment given to the courts by the instant decision must be carefully
restricted to those situations in which, as here, a brokerage reduction
is coupled with a price reduction. If the courts assume the power
to interpret the economic environment of all situations in which
the sanctions of 2 (c) are sought to be invoked, then it will not
be long before 2 (c) loses its "per se thrust," i.e., it will not be long
before courts will be looking at the economic environment to deter-
mine whether a given brokerage manipulation was discriminatory-
not to determine whether there actually was such a manipulation.
Congress has already decided that it is important to protect small,
local businesses from the possibility of harm through the improper
use of "commissions, brokerage, or other compensation, or any al-
lowance or discount in lieu thereof." Whether the Congressional
purpose is realistic, or whether the means used to further it is the
most efficient is not the question. The purpose is clear; the method
has been effective; and until Congress decides to change either or
both, they must be respected by the courts. If the purpose is not to
be frustrated, then careful, analytical interpretation and application
of the instant decision is necessary."
L. E. Creel, III
" The instant case has been through the courts again since the noted decision was
handed down. The second set of trials arose when Broch contended that the cease-and-
desist order issued by the Commission was too broad in that it was not confined to
restraints against the repetition of the precise violation complained of but extended its
prohibitions to Broch's dealings with all other buyers and seller principals. In upholding
the broad sanctions of the Commission's order, the Court reaffirmed its position in the
instant case. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962).
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